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Abstract .  Belief revision has recently been modelled with the help of 
the notion of epistemic entrenchment (G~rdenfors and Makinson, TARK 
1988, and Rott, JoLLI 1992). This paper offers a systematic justification 
of the postulates for entrenchment byinterpreting entrenchment i  terms 
of the general theory of rational choice. A translation is specified f~om 
conditions for entrenchment into conditions for choice, and vice versa. 
The relative strengths of the postulates are studied, and connections with 
related work are discussed. 
1 In t roduct ion  
The notion of the epistemic entrenchment has recently attracted quite some at- 
tention in the AI community. It was introduced, first under the name "epistemic 
importance", by Peter G~irdenfors [7, 8]. He specified two possible "origins" 
of epistemic entrenchment: an information-theoretic appoach and a paradigm 
approach. However, neither of these approaches squares well with the logical 
constraints which are placed on entrenchment relations in the later and more 
mature work of Gfixdenfors and Makinson [10]. Although it is now known how 
epistemic entrenchment can be put to work technically, the problem of provid- 
ing a systematic justification of the postulates for entrenchment relations is still 
largely unresolved. The present paper offers a solution to this problem which is 
faithful to the literal meaning of the term "entrenchment". 
We follow the philosophical strategy of reducing logical principles to abstract 
principles of rationality for decisions and actions which we consider to be more 
fundamental than the former. The standard theory of epistemic entrenchment 
[10, 21] is interpreted in terms of the general theory of rational choice, and the 
following questions are being addressed. Are the usual postulates for entrench- 
ment justified by principles of rational choice? Do the latter principles, or the 
mere interpretation of entrenchments in terms of choice, impose interesting ad- 
ditional constraints on entrenchment relations? Conversely, which principles of 
rational choice can be retrieved from the entrenchment postulates, and what is 
their status in the theory of choice? 
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2 Bas ic  P r inc ip les  
The following considerations presuppose a propositional language that contains 
at least the binary connective 'A' for conjunction. No other connectives will 
be needed for our discussion. An episternic state, or a knowledge base, will be 
represented by the set K of sentences which are believed or accepted by an 
agent in that epistemic state (in the knowledge base). Revision and contraction 
functions are used for the representation f changes of belief. The general format 
is this: (old knowledge base, set to retract) ~ ~ new knowledge base. The retract 
set S consists of the set of sentences at least one of which has to be given up. The 
pick contraction of K with respect o 8, denoted K - (S ) ,  is the minimal (most 
economic) contraction of the belief set K that is necessary in order to discard 
at least one of element of S. It is left to the agent's decision which element(s) of 
S is (are) best to give up. 
We assume in this paper that the beliefs of an agent are closed under conjunction: 
{r162 C K iff r A . . .ACn E K (CCl) 
Call two sentences variants iff they are accepted in exactly the same epistemic 
states. We are interested only in A-variants. From (CC1), we can infer that 
A satisfies associativity, commutativity, A-contraction and A-expansion, which 
allows us to delete parentheses. Conjunctions show a set-like behaviour which we 
call the variability of conjunctions. Our second assumption says that A-variants 
as inputs lead to identical belief states: 
If ~b and r are A-variants, then K - r  = K - r  (CEq) 
The next principle we are going to invoke connects rational contractions with an 
underlying relation of epistemic entrenchment. 
r < r iff r E K - ({r  (Def <) 
This is to express the following idea: r is more firmly entrenched in K than r 
iff the agent would keep r when facing with the need to give up (at least) one 
of r and r 
Our last two principles concern the contractions which are referred to in (Def<). 
In pick contractions the goal is to retract at least one of a set of sentences from 
a given knowledge base K, i.e., to see to it that S g Cn(K-(S)).  We know from 
(CC1) that in order to retract one element of {r Cn}, it is necessary and 
sufficient o give up r  A Cn. Intuitively, the latter task seems even identical 
with the former: 
K-" (r  Cn) --- g : ( r  A . . .  A Cn) (Def<:)) 
Finally, pick contractions present by their very nature problems of rational 
choice. For any non-empty set of sentences S, the agent must make a decision 
which sentences of S to give up in K - (S ) .  He must retract at least one element 
of S, but may in the case of ties of course retract several of them at the same 
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time. In order to get these restrictions started, we presuppose that S ~ Cn(~)). 
We now introduce the device of a choice function 7 such that for every r E S, 
r e 7(S) iff r 6 g- (s )  (DefT) 
In the theory of rational choice, S is called the issue or the menu, and 7(S) is 
called the choice set of S (with respect o 7). As usual for choice functions, it 
is required here that 0 ~ 7(S) C S. Intuitively, 7 picks the elements of S which 
are best to withdraw from K, or least secure in S. If both r and r say, are in 
7(S), this means that the agent suspends judgment on both r and r because no 
decision can be reached as to which of them is worse. We restrict ourselves to 
the case of finite S's in order to ensure that (Def(-)) is applicable. 
The connections established by our basic principles are summarized in Fig. 1. 
It is only the structure imposed on pick contractions by the vertical part of 




Fig. 1. Connecting choice and entrenchment 
3 Trans la t ions  
The general argument to be used in our translations i this: 
r . . .A r  < r ... A r  
iff r  A r E K-" (r  A @~, r A, . ,  A era) by (Def<) 
iff r A.. .  A r E K'--((r162 A ( r  r by (Def(-)) 
iff Vj _< m: ~ E K - ( r  A r A r  A ~,~) by (CCI), (CEq) 
iff Vj _< m: ~/,j E K-({r162 by (Def(-)) 
iff Vj _< m: r r 7({r r r  r by (Def7) 
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In short, we have for any two finite sets of sentences S and S t with S - S t -~ 
that A s < A s '  iff s t n ~(s  u s ' )  = 0. 
3.1 F rom Ent renchments  to  Cho ices  
The translation process is described by the above argument read from the top 
to the bottom. It is actually ambiguous, due to the possibility of leaving some 
conjunctions unbroken. We insist, however, that the standard translation must 
break up every conjunction into its "atomic" parts. But we are not dealing with 
real atoms here. For the translation of axiom schemata below, we must keep 
in mind that all sentential metavariables may be instantiated by conjunctions. 
Hence r A r < X, say, must not be converted simply into X ~ ~/({r r X}), but 
instead into the more general S" n ~,(S u S t u S ' )  = 0, where r r and X are 
thought of as the conjunctions of the elements of S, S t and S", respectively. 
3.2 F rom Cho ices  to  Ent renchments  
The translation process is described by the above argument read from the bot- 
tom to the top. Due to the variability of conjunctions, however, the translation 
process is essentially ambiguous. The fully general formulation is a little com- 
plicated. Let S t U . . .  U S~ = S' and Si be such that Si U ~ -- S U S', for every 
i < k. Then S' n -y(S u S') -- 0 iff for every i, A s~ < A s~. 
3.3 Admiss ib le  Re la t ions  
Which relations < over the set of all sentences in our language can possibly qual- 
ify as entrenchment relations? Our basic principles limit the field of candidate 
relations considerably. First, we get the condition of substitutivity ofvariants: 
If r and r are A-variants, then r < X iff r < X, and X < r iff X < r (SV) 
When considering some ~,(S) we presuppose that S is finite and S ~ Cn(@). 
Recall that the concept of a choice function requires that ~/(S) be a non-empty 
subset of S. By the above translation, this means that 
r A... A Cn % r (NE) 
The ambiguity in the translation of conditions of epistemic entrenchment into 
choice conditions is irrelevant for our concerns. On the other hand, the ambiguity 
involved in the converse direction is important. This is because ntrenchment 
relations take account of the internal structure of the sentences related. We 
are thus presented essentially with a many-one translation. Many conditions on 
the side of epistemic entrenchment correspond to exactly one condition on the 
side of rational choice. For this reason some nontrivial necessary conditions on 
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entrenchment relations are to be imposed. Our aim is to make the entrenchment 
relation < consistently translatable into (and a consistent translation of) a choice 
function 7. The key idea is the following condition which embodies in a nutshell 
the connection between entrenchment and choice: 
r162  X iff CAr  r (E&C) 
Clearly, (E&C) is a necessary condition for translatable relations <, because 
both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (E&C) translate into (and are 
translations of) {r X} n ff({r r X}) = 0. Now let S~ U... U S~ = S' and Si such 
that Si U S~ = S U S', for every i < k. It can be verified that 
AS<AS'  iff AS ,<AS~forevery i  
The right-hand side is the fully general translation for S' n 7(S u S') = O. Our 
standard translation and (E&C) suffice for deriving it. 
Given (SV) and (E&C), (NE) is equivalent to the asymmetry of <. We call 
an arbitrary relation < between sentences admissible (for the representation f 
entrenchments) if and only if it is asymmetric and satisfies (SV) and (E&C). 
Only admissible relations can qualify as relations of epistemic entrenchment. 
4 Pos tu la tes  
4.1 Postu lates for Coherent Choice 
The constraint (E&C) was placed on a relation < since there are different ways 
of encoding the choices determined by 7 in one and the same issue S. More 
constraints will be imposed on entrenchment relations when coherence conditions 
connecting choices in different issues (of different cardinality) are respected. The 
following discussion is based on a set of postulates for choice functions which are 
well-known in the literature on rational choice and which play--with one slight 
modification--a central role in the model theory of belief revision in [23]. 
If S C_ S', then S n 7(S') C_ 7(S) (I) 
n 7(S,) C_ 7(U S,) (II) 
i_<k ~<k 
If S C_ S' and 7(S') C_ S, then 7(S) C_ 7(S') (III) 
If S C_ S' and 7(S') n S ~ 0, then 7(S) C_ 7(S') (IV) 
Condition (I) is Sen's Property a and sometimes called "ChernolT'; (II) is a finite 
version of Sen's Property 7, also called "expansion axiom"; (III) is sometimes 
called "Aizerman's axiom"; (IV) is Sen's Property ~+, also known as "Dual 
Chernoff'. Notice that (IV) implies both (II) and (III). As there are many rela- 
tions < satisfying (I) - (IV), this set of postulates i consistent. 
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A relation < is called modular iff r < r entails that either r < X or X < r 
for every X. Modularity and asymmetry jointly entail transitivity. A choice func- 
tion 3" is called (transitively, modularly) rationalizable iff there is a (transitive, 
modular) preference relation < such that for all S, 
3"(S) -- {r E S:  there is no r E S such that r < r 
The following facts have been common knowledge in the theory of rational choice 
at least since Sen [25]. 
Observat ion 1 Let 3" be a choice function which can take all finite subsets of a 
given domain as arguments. 
(a) 3" is rationalizable i ff it is rationalizable by the preference relation defined by 
r < r iE r  r 3'({r r (,) 
(b) 3' is rationalizable iff it satisfies (I) and (II); 
(c) 3" is transitively rationalizable iff it satisfies (I), (II), and (III); 
(d) 3" is modularly rationalizable iff it satisfies (I) and (IV). 
Condition (.) is a typical definition of "revealed preferences" which are widely 
used in the theory of choice and preference. It is the asymmetric version of the 
"base preferences" originating with H. Uzawa and K. Arrow. Condition (.) above 
can be obtained by conjoining (Def<) with (Def3'). Epistemic entrenchment is 
just a certain kind of revealed preference. It is more general insofar as it can take 
combinations (i.e., conjunctions) of elements rather than only single elements as 
arguments. The objects between which to choose possess an internal structure. 
4.2 Postulates for Epistemic Entrenchment 
Essentially the following set of postulates is advocated as a set of conditions 
suitable for capturing the notion of epistemic entrenchment in Rott [21], where 
a corresponding set of postulates for belief revision is specified. 
I f r162  thenr162 
I f r162  thenCAx<r  
I f r  <r  andr  then r < CAX 
I fCAr162 thenr162 
(EEl) 
(EE2 T ) 
(EE2 $ ) 
(EE3 T ) 
(EE3 ~ )
If we add the postulate of virtual connectivity or modularity, 
I f r162  thenr162 (EE4) 
we get essentially the concept of epistemic entrenchment asoriginally introduced 
by G~denfors and Makinson [10]. We refer to relations atisfying (EEl) - (EE3 ~) 
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as generalized relations of epistemic entrenchment, and to those satisfying in 
addition (EE4) as standard relations of epistemic entrenchment. Modularity is a 
very powerful condition. It corresponds tothe condition of Rational Monotony-- 
postulate (-8) in the AGM nomenclature--in the theory of belief revision. For 
the theory of epistemic entrenchment, it has the following consequences: 
Observation 2 Suppose the relation < satisfies (EEl) and (EE4). Then (a) < 
satisfies (EEg T) iff it satisfies (EEg ~ ); (b) if< satisfies (BE3 t ), then it satisfies 
(ZZ3 ~ ); if < is asymmetric and satisfies (BE3 $), then it also satisfies (BE3 T ). 
Relations of epistemic entrenchment with comparability can thus be character- 
ized, e.g., by postulates (EEl), (EE2T), (EE3 T) and (EFA). There are also min- 
imality and maximality conditions in [10] which correspond to the following 
constraints on 7: 
7(S) ---- S - g iff S - g ~ 0 (Minimality) 
7(S) N Cn(O) = 0, unless S C_ Cn(O) (Maximality) 
These conditions relate 7 to K and Cn and are thus not purely structural con- 
ditions of rational choice. 
5 The Postulates Translated 
5.1 From Coherent Choice to Epistemic Entrenchment 
We wish to see whether some widely accepted coherence criteria for choices are 
already taken account of by the usual requirements for epistemic entrenchment 
relations. By (non-trivial) application of the translation specified in Section 3.2, 
we get the following constraints on entrenchment relations. 
I f r162  theneAx<r  (EI) 
I feA lb<X,  thenr162 (EII) 
I feAr162 thenr  (EIII) 
I feAr162162 thenr  (EIV) 
Relations atisfying--at least some interesting selection from--the postulates 
(EI) - (EIV) can be taken to exhibit features of rational choice. 
5.2 From Epistemic Entrenchment  to Coherent Choice 
By (straightforward) application of the translation specified in Section 3.1 , we 
get the following constraints on choice functions. 
S n 7(S) # 0 (CC1) 
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If(SuS')nT(SuS'uS")=O, thenS'nT(S'US")=O (CC2 T) 
I fSAT(SUS' )=O,  thenSAT(SUS 'US" )=O (CC21) 
If S' n 7(S u S') = 0 and S" A 7(S U S") = 0, 
then (S' U S") A "y(S U S' U S") = ~ (CC3 T) 
I fSAT(SUSUS' )=O , thenSAT(SUS ' )=O (CC3~) 
If S A 7(S U S') = 0, then S A 7(S U S") = 0 
or 5" A 7(S' U S") = 0 (CC4) 
6 Impl i ca t ions  
We now study the relative strength of the postulates for choice and entrench- 
ment. 
6.1 Implications between Choice Postulates 
Observation 3 (a) (CC1) holds for every choice function 7; (b) (CC2 T) is 
equivalent with (III); (c) (CC2~) is equivalent with (I); (d) (CC3 T) follows 
trivially from (OC21); (e) (CC31) is trivially satisfied; (f) (CC4) implies (IV), 
and follows from the conjunction of (I) and (IV). 
Part (d) of Observation 3 shows that although (EE3 T) is logically independent 
from (EE21) in the theory of epistemic entrenchment, the translations are not. 
Part (e) tells us that although (EE3~) in non-trivial, its translation is. The ex- 
planation for these surprising facts is that given the admissibility of <, (EE3 T) 
is just a weakening of (EE21), and (EE3$) does not add anything new. To- 
gether with Observation 1, parts (c) and (f) of Observation 3 reveal a new 
axiomatization ofmodularly rationalizable choice functions: A choice function is 
rationalizable by a modular preference relation iff it satisfies (CC25) and (CC4). 
6.2 Implications between Entrenchment Postulates 
We know from the previous ection and the translatability of choice conditions 
into conditions for entrenchment relations that certain equivalences must hold 
between the original conditions et up in [10] and [21] and the ones derived from 
coherent choice. Still it is instructive to study in detail the interrelations at the 
level of entrenchment relations. 
Observat ion 4 (a) (NE) follows from (EEl) and (EE3 T); (b) (E~C) follows 
from (EE2 T ), (EE~ I ), (BE3 T) and (EE31); (c) (EI) is identical with (BE21); 
(d) (Eli) follows from (EEl), (BE3 T) and (BE4); (e) (EIII) follows from (BE2 T ), 
(BE21), (EE3 T) and (BE3 ~); (f) (EIV) follows from (BE21), (BE31) and 
(EE4). 
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Observat ion 5 (a) (EEl) follows from (NE); (b) (EE2 T) follows from (E~C) 
and (ZIII); (c) (EE2 ~ ) is identical with (EI); (d) (EE3 T) follows from (E~C) 
and (EI); (e) (EE3 ~) follows from (EIII); (f) (EE4) follows from (E84C), (EI), 
(EIII) and (EIV). 
For admissible relations <, (EIV) implies both (EII) and (EIII), just as (IV) 
implies (II) and (III). Thus asymmetry, (SV), (E&C), (EI) and (EIV) provide 
an alternative axiomatization f epistemic entrenchment. 
7 Conc lus ion  and  Re la ted  Work  
Let us summarize the major results of the previous sections in non-technical 
terms, thereby answering the questions asked in the introduction: 
9 The entrenchment postulates (EEl), (EE21), (EE3 T) and (EE3&), translated 
into constraints on the choice of retractible sentences, are satisfied by all ra- 
tionalizable choice functions. In addition, (EE2 T) is satisfied by all transitively 
rationalizable choice functions, and (EFA) is satisfied by all modularly rational- 
izable choice functions. 
9 The choice postulates (I) and (III), translated into constraints on the entrench- 
ment of sentences, as well as the general admissibility constraints imposed by 
the interpretation of entrenchment in terms of choices, are satisfied by all gen- 
eralized relations of epistemic entrenchment. In addition, the choice postulates 
(II) and (IV) are satisfied by all standard relations of epistemic entrenchment. 
9 All admissible relations < satisfying the choice postulates (I) and (III), trans- 
lated into constraints on the entrenchment of sentences, are generalized relations 
of epistemic entrenchment. If < in addition satisfies (IV), translated into a con- 
straints on the entrenchment of sentences, it is a standard relations of epistemic 
entrenchment. 
In a companion paper [24], we study the correspondences between choice postu- 
lates and systems of nonmonotonic reasoning which are based on choices or pref- 
erences between default assumptions or expectations. It turns out that (I) corre- 
sponds to the condition "Or", (II) to a weakened form of Disjunctive Monotony, 
(III) to Cumulative Monotony, and (IV) to Rational Monotony. (For all these 
terms, see [6, 13, 16, 17].) It is interesting that seen from the present perspective, 
Disjunctive Monotony is at least as plausible as Cumulative Monotony. 
The focus of the present paper has been the concept of epistemic entrench- 
ment (or that of an "expectation ordering" [11]). However, we gave no material 
explanation where the entrenchment relations might come from. What we have 
attempted to give is rather a theoretical explanation or justification of the logical 
constraints for such relations. We now briefly discuss alternative ways of doing 
this. 
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First of all, we note that in the literature one can distinguish qualitative-relational 
from quantitative-numerical approaches, with the obvious connection that r < r 
(where '<' is epistemic entrenchment) iff Ent(r < Ent(r (where '<' is the 
usual less-than relation over ordinal or real numbers). More importantly, we 
can also distinguish comparative-necessity based approaches from comparative- 
possibility based approaches, with the connection r < r iff -~r -~ -~r or 
Ent(r = Plaus(-~r (see, e.g., [11, Appendix A2]). Here ~r ~ -~r is to be 
understood as saying that -~  is closer to one's present beliefs, or more plausi- 
ble, than -~r and similarly, smaller Plaus-values ignify a higher plausibility. 
Epistemic entrenchment is perhaps the best known example of the former kind, 
while various people are working in the second framework, for instance, Lewis, 
Spohn, Grove, and Freund. In much of the work of Dubois and Prade the con- 
nection between comparative necessity and possibility is carefully discussed. 
There have been several attempts to give a natural derivation of relations of 
comparative necessity or possibility. (In the following, we mean by an ordering 
a weak ordering in which ties are permitted.) Firstly, one can derive an ordering 
of propositions from an ordering of models. The basic idea is best expressed 
in terms of comparative possibility and says that Plaus(r = inf{Plaus(w) : 
w satisfies r The usual logical constraints on comparative possibility are then 
automatically satisfied. This idea can be traced back at least to David Lewis' 
[14] construction of comparative possibilities out of comparative similarities and 
Lofti A. Zadeh's [27] construction of a possibility measure out of a possibility 
distribution. The latter approach as been turned into a powerful research pro- 
gram by Dubois and Prade and their collaborators ( ee, e.g., [2, 5]). The former 
approach as been extended and modified by Grove [12] and Spohn [26], and 
also--as we now know with the benefit of hindsight--in the research paradigm of 
Alchourr6n, G~irdenfors and Makinson [1, 8, 11, 19]. Here the necessity-like con- 
cept of epistemic entrenchment has been constructed from a preference relation 
of maximal non-implying subsets (which in turn stand in a 1-1-correspondence to 
the non-models) of the current belief set. A more general model-theoretic char- 
acterization of comparative possibility without connectivity has been given by 
Freund [6]. Except for a limiting case condition for logical truths, his postulates 
for "preferential preorderings" are exact duals of the postulates for generalized 
epistemic entrenchment of Rott [21]. 
Secondly, one can draw on syntactical constructions starting from arbitrary (par- 
tial) orderings of the sentences in a belief base. Here one can distinguish apositive 
and a negative idea. The first one, suggested for the first time by Dubois and 
Prade [4], judges the entrenchment of r according to the weakest elements in 
any proof set for r A more general version of this idea without connectivity 
assumptions has independently been used in [20]. The second one, suggested in
Rott [22], judges the entrenchment of r according to the most conservative or 
economical way to discard r It has been shown that in the context of prioritized 
belief bases this relation is identical with the relation studied in the present paper 
(minimal change vs. competitive interpretation of epistemic entrenchment [22]), 
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and that it can be used to approximate prioritized base contractions in the style 
of Nebel [18]. It is not difficult o show that the negative idea leads to a (proper) 
extension of epistemic entrenchment relation < obtained from formalizing the 
positive idea. However, the usual way of applying epistemic entrenchment rela- 
tions [10, 21] does not lead to very good results in the context of belief bases (as 
opposed to belief sets which are closed under Cn), since they suffer from what 
Benferhat et al. [2] call the "drowning effect". 
Thirdly, entrenchment relations have been reconstructed from contraction be- 
haviour over full belief sets (Giirdenfors and Makinson [10, 21]). This is evidently 
very close the the approach followed in this paper, but the crucial and strong 
AGM postulates (K-7)  and (K-8)  are not as systematically motivated as the 
criteria studied in rational choice theory. 
Finally, we mention that the decision-theoretic or choice-theoretic framework has 
already been systematically employed in belief revision and nonmonotonic rea- 
soning by LindstrSm [15] and Rott [23]. There, however, preferences and choices 
are considered on the model-theoretical level, and no relations between sentences 
are considered. Correspondingly, problems of conceptualization, postulates for 
contractions, and methods of proof are quite different. Perhaps the first author 
to point out the relevance of the theory of choice and its economic sense of ratio- 
nality for belief revision was Doyle [3], who however used preferences over sets 
of sentences and did not study the implications of criteria of rational choice for 
the logic of belief change. 
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